Impacts of the Information-technology Revolution on Japanese Manufacturer-supplier Relationships by Hodaka Morita & Hirohiko Nakahara
 
 







School of Economics 
The University of New South Wales 
Sydney 2052, Australia 
H.Morita@unsw.edu.au 
Hirohiko Nakahara 







‘Vertical keiretsu’, characterized by suppliers’ willingness to make customized investments 
and their long-term relationships with manufacturers, had been recognized as an important 
source of strength in Japanese industries. Our model predicts that, in contrast to the recent 
popular argument, the information-technology revolution can strengthen ‘vertical keiretsu’. 
This is because the efficiency of designing customized parts is significantly enhanced if 
suppliers undertake a substantial level of IT investments such as the introduction of 3D CAD 
systems, and the customized nature of such investments could reduce the number of potential 
suppliers. Our interviews with Japanese manufacturers provide a support to this prediction. 
 
JEL Classification number: L29 
Keywords: Customized investment, Information technology, Japanese firm, Vertical  
Keiretsu, Subcontracting 
                                                 
* We thank Garry Barrett, Kaushik Basu, Takahiro Fujimoto, Arghya Ghosh, Suman Ghosh, Robert Hart, 
Hideshi Itoh, Murray Kemp, Kieron Meagher, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Hideo Owan, Tridip Ray, Bill 
Schworm, Michael Waldman, anonymous referees and seminar participants at La Trobe University, University 
of Melbourne, New South Wales and Tokyo for helpful comments and discussions, Hirohiko Izumida for an 
arrangement to conduct a part of this research at MITI research institute, and all the interviewees who gave us 
their time for answering our questions. Morita is grateful for financial support from the University Research 
Support Program of the University of New South Wales. Views expressed here should not be taken as those of 









Japanese manufacturer-supplier relationships have been intensively studied 
throughout the 1980s, and a number of researchers have identified the cooperative 
relationships based on long-term relationships and suppliers’ willingness to make customized 
investments as their key features. Namely, Japanese manufacturers purchase intermediate 
products (or parts) repeatedly from a limited number of suppliers on a long-term basis, and 
the suppliers are willing to make investments specific to their purchaser in order to produce 
customized parts.
1 Asanuma (1989) studied the Japanese automobile and the electric 
machinery industries and found that these two features are closely interrelated. According to 
his observations, as the extent of customization increases, the manufacturer-supplier 
relationships tend to become longer-term and more stable. 
The Japanese manufacturer-supplier relationships characterized by these features have 
often been called ‘vertical keiretsu’, and regarded as a major source of strength in Japanese 
manufacturing industries. The MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity concluded, based 
on a number of case studies conducted in the late 1980s, that US manufacturers should 
establish Japanese-type cooperative relationships with their suppliers in order to regain their 
productive edge (see Dertouzos, Lester and Solow, 1989). Since 1989, Chrysler Corporation 
had made a substantial effort to establish Japanese-type relationships with its suppliers. Dyer 
(1996) observed that, as a result, suppliers increased their investment in dedicated assets – 
plants, equipment, systems, processes, and people dedicated exclusively to serving Chrysler’s 
needs. 
                                                 
1 For example, Dyer and Ouchi (1993) found, based on their comparative study of the Japanese and the US 
automobile industries, that the Japanese suppliers were willing to invest in customized equipment and customer-
specific human capital (e.g., let their own engineers develop significant partner-specific knowledge), and locate 
their plants quite close to the manufacturer. Nishiguchi (1994) obtained similar findings from his extensive 
comparative study of British and Japanese subcontracting in the electronics industry. According to Aoki (1988), 
only three firms exited from the association of first-tier Toyota suppliers between 1973 and 1984, whereas 21 







In contrast, a number of people recently asserted that recent advances in information 
technology (call it the IT revolution hereafter) would dramatically change the basic nature of 
Japanese manufacturer-supplier relationships. For example, a leading economist in Japan 
argued in a recent newspaper article that Japanese manufacturers would change the nature of 
parts required for their products from customized parts to standard parts, and would procure 
them from a larger number of potential suppliers through the internet rather than from a 
limited number of suppliers within their own corporate groups (or ‘keiretsu’).
2 
  How will the IT revolution impact on manufacturer-supplier relationships? Will 
‘vertical keiretsu’ disappear in Japan? This is an important question when we consider the 
sources of strength of manufacturing industries in the New Economy. We address this 
question both theoretically and empirically. We first consider an interaction between a 
manufacturer and suppliers in a two-period setting. In each period, the manufacturer 
determines the design of its final product, which in turn specifies the functional requirements 
for parts. We say that the manufacturer chooses a customized interface with a part if the 
product design requires that the design of the part should be tailored to the specific 
requirements of the manufacturer. Otherwise, we say that it chooses the standard interface. A 
customized interface requires customized parts whereas the standard interface requires 
standard parts.
3 The value of a customized part for the manufacturer is higher than that of the 
standard part, but, in order to produce customized parts, a supplier must make investments 
customized to the manufacturer. 
We incorporate two major effects of the IT revolution into our framework. First, the 
prevalence of the internet reduces the downstream firm’s cost for contacting and 
communicating with potential suppliers. Second, the efficiency of designing customized parts 
                                                 
2 Asahi Newspaper on September 18, 2000. 
3 This formulation is consistent with the concept of product architecture developed in the product design 
literature. For instance, Ulrich (1995) distinguishes between a modular architecture and an integral architecture, 
and asserts that firms have substantial latitude in choosing a product architecture. He argues that components (or 







can be substantially improved by taking advantage of the IT revolution, 3D CAD (Three-
dimensional Computer-Aided Design) systems in particular, which enhance the efficiency for 
engineers of manufacturers and suppliers to coordinate their design activities. The realization 
of such efficiency, however, requires higher levels of customized investments. For instance, 
suppliers need to introduce and maintain a 3D CAD system that is tailored to that of their 
purchaser. See Section 3 for more details on these effects. 
  Our model predicts two distinct patterns for impacts of the IT revolution on 
manufacturer-supplier relationships. On one hand, the IT revolution can induce the 
manufacturer to choose the standard interface, and contact and communicate with a larger 
number of potential suppliers for purchasing the standard parts. This is consistent with the 
recent popular argument as described above; that is, due to the IT revolution, ‘vertical 
keiretsu’ would become weaker or even disappear from many Japanese manufacturer-
supplier relationships.  
However, our analysis suggests that this is only one side of the coin. It also predicts 
that, after the IT revolution, the manufacturer can either continue to choose a customized 
interface or switch from the standard interface to a customized interface, and procure 
customized parts from a smaller number of potential suppliers who make higher levels of 
customized investments. In other words, ‘vertical keiretsu’ could become stronger due to the 
IT revolution. The nature of product development process, which differs across products, 
seems to be an important factor that determines which type of the impact to emerge. That is, 
the latter pattern is more likely if the importance of close coordination among engineers made 
possible by 3D CAD systems is sufficiently high for a given product, and the former pattern 
is more likely otherwise.  
  We have conducted interviews with ten large Japanese manufacturing firms 
concerning impacts of the IT revolution on their relationships with suppliers, and identified 
both of the two predicted patterns described above. Concerning the second pattern, five out of 
ten manufacturers expected that, as a result of the IT revolution, they would purchase 
customized parts from a smaller number of potential suppliers. In other words, these 







become stronger for some kinds of parts due to the IT revolution. This finding is in contrast 
to the recent popular argument described above. Also, we have identified a similar pattern in 
the US automobile industry from our preliminary interviews. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a two-period model 
of an interaction between a manufacturer and suppliers, in which the manufacturer chooses an 
interface of its product with a part from a customized interface or the standard interface. 
Section 3 first considers the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of the model, and then 
analyzes a variant of the model that incorporates the two effects of the IT revolution in our 
framework. The comparison of the equilibrium of the original model and the variant of the 
model yields predictions of our model concerning impacts of the IT revolution on 
manufacturer-supplier relationships. Section 4 presents findings from our interviews with ten 
Japanese manufacturing firms concerning impacts of the IT revolution on their relationships 
with suppliers. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
2. The Model 
  We consider an interaction between a downstream firm and upstream firms (indexed 
by i = 1, 2, …) in a two-period setting. There is free entry of upstream firms, and firms are all 
risk neutral. In each period, the downstream firm produces one unit of a final product, and the 
production requires one unit of intermediate product (call it ‘part’) produced by an upstream 
firm. In each period, the downstream firm chooses an interface between its final product and 
the part; it chooses either a customized interface or the standard interface. A customized 
interface requires a customized part, whereas the standard interface requires the standard part. 
The value of the standard part for the downstream firm is g (> 0). If the downstream firm 
chooses a customized interface, it announces the required level of quality (or value) of the 
customized part, which is denoted q (> 0). This is consistent with the following observation 
by Asanuma (1985a, b; 1989) who studied the Japanese automobile and electric machinery 
industries in details: When a manufacturer develops a new model, in many cases the 







suppliers compete against each other for developing a part that meets the requirements at 
lower production costs. 
In order to produce a customized part, in each period an upstream firm must make a 
given level of a fixed customized investment (denoted f  > 0). In order to meet the quality 
requirement q (> 0), it also makes a level of a variable customized investment, denoted x (≥  
0), which determines the quality of the customized part by h(x) + µ .
4 Here, h(⋅ ) is a twice 
continuously differentiable function with h'(x) > 0 and h''(x) < 0 for all x ≥  0, h'(0) = +∞ , 
h'(+∞ ) = 0 and h(0) ≥  g; and µ  = λ  (> 0) if the upstream firm made a customized investment 
in the previous period and µ  = 0 otherwise.
5 This specification captures the idea that an 
upstream firm can more efficiently develop a customized part due to learning by doing if it 
experienced the development in the previous period. Assume that these investments are 
verifiable, and that the downstream firm can subsidize the customized investment.
6 
  In order to procure a part from a supplier, the downstream firm must contact and 
communicate with potential suppliers by incurring communication costs of y (> 0) per 
upstream firm. We assume that the value of y is sufficiently small so that the downstream 
firm can make a positive expected profit in equilibrium.
7 Each upstream firm i’s production 
cost per part (whether a customized part or the standard part) in period t is given by c – ε it per 
                                                 
4 An example of the variable customized investment includes working hours of engineers for designing 
customized parts. An alternative assumption for the fixed customized investment is that the investment is valid 
for two periods. The qualitative nature of the results would be unchanged under the alternative assumption. 
5 Given the quality requirement q (> 0), the required level of a variable customized investment is h
-1(q – µ ) if q ≥  
h(0) + µ  and 0 otherwise. 
6 Dyer and Ouchi (1993) pointed out that Japanese manufacturers often send consultants (paid by the 
manufacturers) to work with the supplier (often for months) to improve productivity and quality. A manager of 
an NEC supplier explained, ‘We were always in competition with another supplier to produce the lowest-cost, 
highest-quality circuit boards. NEC would often provide assistance to both of us by sending in teams of 
engineers to help us improve. … ’ 







unit, where c (> 0) is a constant and ε it is a random variable. We assume that ε it is identically 
and independently distributed according to a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, and c – 1 
> 0. We also assume c ≤  g – 1. This assumption implies that the production cost is 
sufficiently small relative to the value of the part, and so the downstream firm purchases a 
part (customized or standard) with probability one through procurement auction in 
equilibrium.  
Each period t (= 1 or 2) consists of three stages. For simplicity, assume that all players 
share a common discount factor equal to one.  
[Stage 1] The downstream firm chooses either a customized interface or the standard 
interface, and contacts and communicates with potential suppliers by incurring 
communication costs of y (> 0) per upstream firm. The choice becomes common knowledge. 
If the downstream firm chooses a customized interface, it announces the required level of 
quality (or value) of the customized part, denoted q (> 0). Also, the downstream firm can 
announce a level of subsidy, denoted s (≥  0). The subsidy will be paid in the next stage to 
each upstream firm that makes a sufficient level of the customized investment for achieving 
the required level of quality q (> 0).  
[Stage 2] If the downstream firm chose a customized interface in the previous stage, each 
potential supplier determines whether or not to make the required level of customized 
investment, which is f + h
-1(q – µ ) – s if q ≥  h(0) + µ  and f – s otherwise. The decision 
becomes common knowledge.  
[Stage 3] The random variable ε it is realized and observed only by upstream firm i. The 
downstream firm can then purchase a part (either a customized part or the standard part, 
depending on its choice of interface in the first stage) from a potential supplier (whom it 
contacted and communicated with in the first period) through a procurement auction. The 












  In this section, we first consider the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of the 
model described above, and characterize the equilibria in Proposition 1. We then consider a 
variant of the model that incorporates two effects of the IT revolution in our framework, and 
characterize the equilibria of the variant of the model in Proposition 2. Propositions 1 and 2 
together yield predictions concerning impacts of the IT revolution on manufacturer-supplier 
relationships. Throughout the analysis, we define Customized-equilibrium (C-equilibrium) 
and Standard-equilibrium (S-equilibrium) as follows:  
C-equilibrium: In each period, the downstream firm chooses a customized interface and  
contacts and communicates with nC (≥  1) potential suppliers, and all of them make the 
required level of customized investments. The downstream firm purchases a unit of 
the customized part from a potential supplier that has realized the lowest production 
cost. The identity of upstream firm(s) that make customized investments is unchanged 
across periods. 
S-equilibrium: In each period, the downstream firm chooses the standard interface and  
contacts and communicates with nS (≥  1) potential suppliers. It purchases a unit of the 
standard part from a potential supplier that has realized the lowest production cost. 
Note, all proofs are in Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 1: For any given parameter values, there exists a value  f  (> 0) such that, 
holding all parameter values except f fixed, the model exhibits the Customized-equilibrium 
(C-equilibrium) if f <  f  and the Standard-equilibrium (S-equilibrium) if f >  f , where nS ≥  
nC holds. 
 
  An upstream firm must make a customized investment in order to produce customized 
parts. Since the investment pays off later only for an upstream firm who wins the 
procurement auction, a relatively small number of upstream firms make customized 
investments in the C-equilibrium. In contrast, since the production of the standard part does 







larger number of potential suppliers if it chooses the standard interface. Hence, the expected 
value of the lowest production cost among potential suppliers is higher in the C-equilibrium 
than in the S-equilibrium. Given free entry of upstream firms, the higher production cost and 
the cost of customized investments are reflected in the higher equilibrium price of the 
customized part. On the other hand, the downstream firm can enhance the market value of its 
final product by using a customized part. Under this trade-off, if the level of the fixed 
customized investment is sufficiently low, a customized interface becomes more attractive 
option for the downstream firm and so the model exhibits the C-equilibrium. 
  In the C-equilibrium, a limited number of potential suppliers make customized 
investments in the first period, and one that has realized the lowest production cost is chosen 
as a supplier for the period. The same upstream firms make customized investments again in 
the next period due to learning by doing concerning customized investments. This 
equilibrium captures observations of Japanese manufacturer-supplier relationships made by a 
number of researchers throughout the 1980s. That is, as discussed in Introduction, Japanese 
manufacturers typically purchase parts from a limited number of suppliers who are willing to 
make investments specific to their purchaser in order to produce customized parts, where the 
identity of these suppliers is relatively unchanged over time. 
Furthermore, the C-equilibrium captures ‘multiple vendor policy’, which has been 
employed by many Japanese manufacturers. According to a series of careful and 
comprehensive case studies of the Japanese automobile and electric machinery industries by 
Asanuma (1985a, b; 1989), when a manufacturer develops a new model, the manufacturer 
typically lets several potential suppliers compete against each other for winning an order of a 
customized part. Given functional requirements announced by the manufacturer, they 
compete against each other for meeting the requirements at the lowest possible production 
cost. At the end of the development period, one supplier wins the contest and becomes the 
sole supplier of the part throughout the life span of the model. The competition is repeated 
when the manufacturer develops a new model. 
   In reality, most products have multiple interfaces with parts, and manufacturers 







former choice is captured by the C-equilibrium and the latter by the S-equilibrium in our 
theoretical framework. Although transactions of customized parts have attracted much 
attention in Japanese manufacturer-supplier relationships, many Japanese manufacturers also 
procure a substantial amount of standard parts. For example, out of ten Japanese 
manufacturing firms we interviewed, seven firms told us that they procured a non-negligible 
amount of standard parts (see Section 4 for more details). 
Next, we consider a variant of the model which incorporates the following two effects 
of the IT revolution in our framework. First, the prevalence of the internet reduces the 
manufacturer’s cost for contacting and communicating with potential suppliers. Malone et al. 
(1987) argued, in their comparative analysis of electronic markets and electronic hierarchies, 
that buyers incur substantial coordination costs if they procure inputs through markets, 
because they must gather and analyze information from a variety of possible suppliers. They 
then pointed out that the use of information technology seems likely to decrease these costs, 
because the essence of coordination involves processing information.
8  
Second, the efficiency of designing customized parts can be substantially improved by 
taking advantage of the IT revolution, 3D CAD (Three-dimensional Computer-Aided Design) 
systems in particular. Baba and Nobeoka (1998) argue that 3D CAD systems have substantial 
impacts on the process and the efficiency of product development. 3D CAD systems enable 
designers and engineers to fully visualize their products and easily exchange information on 
product design. Furthermore, they can view an assembled set of components before physical 
prototypes are made (called ‘digital pre-assembly’). This substantially enhances the 
efficiency for engineers of manufacturers and suppliers to coordinate their design activities 
especially at an early stage of product development, which plays a crucial role for achieving 
product integrity (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991).
9 The realization of such efficiency, however, 
                                                 
8 See also, e.g., Bakos (1997), Barua et al. (1997) and Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001) for similar arguments. 
9 Clark and Fujimoto (1991) observed in the Japanese automobile industry that engineers from suppliers and 
those from a manufacturer communicated with each other very closely in designing better customized parts. See 







requires higher levels of customized investments. For instance, suppliers need to introduce 
and maintain a 3D CAD system that is tailored to that of their purchaser.
10 
In the variant of the model, everything is the same as in the original model except the 
following: First, the downstream firm’s communication cost is given by y’ ≡  y – ∆ y instead of 
y, where 0 < ∆ y < y. Second, in order to produce a customized part, each upstream firm has 
an option of making an IT-customized investment (for which investment in 3D CAD systems 
is the most important example) by incurring a higher level of fixed customized investment  
f + ∆ f where ∆ f > 0. Under this option, the value of the customized part is determined by 
θ h(x) + µ  rather than h(x) + µ , where θ  > 1. The parameter θ  captures the extent to which the 
efficiency of designing customized parts is improved through closer coordination among 
engineers of the manufacturer and suppliers made possible by the IT-customized investment. 
Note that the efficiency of the IT-customized investment is increasing in θ  and decreasing in 
∆ f. Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibria of this variant of the model. 
 
Proposition 2: (i) For any given parameter values, there exists a value  f  (> 0) such that, 
holding all parameter values except f fixed, the variant of the model exhibits the C-
equilibrium if f <  f  and the S-equilibrium if f >  f , where nS ≥  nC holds. 
(ii) For any given parameter values, there exists a value θ ’ (> 1) such that  
  (a) if f <  f , all potential suppliers make IT-customized investments in the C-equilibrium if  
       and only if θ  > θ ’, 
  (b)  f  is increasing in θ  for all θ  > θ ’ while f  is independent of θ  for all θ  < θ ’, and  
  (c)  f  is decreasing in ∆ f if θ  > θ ’ while  f  is independent of ∆ f if θ  < θ ’. 
                                                 
10 As an example, US automobile manufacturers use different 3D CAD systems (DaimlerChrysler uses CATIA, 
Ford uses I-DEAS, and General Motors uses Unigraphics). Also, in Japanese automobile industry, Toyota uses 
CADCEUS, Nissan uses I-DEAS and Honda uses CATIA.  
Costs for introducing a 3D CAD system (including training costs) are substantially higher than those 
for a 2D CAD system. Greco (2000) points out that many companies still use 2D CAD systems due to the high 








  The first part of Proposition 2 is analogous to Proposition 1. That is, if the level of the 
fixed customized investment is lower than the threshold  f , the downstream firm chooses a 
customized interface in each period and so the variant of the model exhibits the C-
equilibrium, whereas it exhibits the S-equilibrium otherwise. The second part investigates 
how the threshold  f  is affected by the efficiency of the IT-customized investment. In the C-
equilibrium, all potential suppliers make IT-customized investments if the IT-customized 
investment is sufficiently efficient (that is, if θ  > θ ’). Given θ  > θ ’, the threshold  f  is 
increasing in θ  and decreasing in ∆ f. In other words, as the efficiency of the IT-customized 
investment increases, it becomes more likely that the variant of the model exhibits the C-
equilibrium.  
  In the next proposition, we investigate impacts of the IT-revolution in our framework 
by comparing the equilibrium of the original model and the equilibrium of the variant of the 
model. 
 
Proposition 3: For a given set of parameter values, the equilibrium of the original model and 
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As discussed in Introduction, a number of people recently asserted that pattern II 
above would be the major impact of the IT revolution on Japanese manufacturer-supplier 







would become weaker or even disappear from many Japanese manufacturer-supplier 
relationships. The number of potential suppliers increases after the IT revolution in pattern II 
as well as in pattern I. 
However, our analysis indicates that this is only one side of the coin. It predicts that 
pattern III or IV can also be an impact of the IT revolution. Prediction here is that, after the 
IT revolution, the manufacturer either continues to choose a customized interface or switches 
from the standard interface to a customized interface. The number of potential suppliers 
decreases after the IT revolution in pattern III, and it can also decrease in pattern IV.
11 The 
reason is that, in order to take advantage of the IT revolution, each potential supplier may be 
required to make a higher level of customized investments, which in turn reduces the optimal 
number of potential suppliers. Namely, as a result of the IT revolution, manufacturers could 
procure customized parts from a smaller number of potential suppliers who make higher 
levels of customized investments. In other words, ‘vertical keiretsu’ could become stronger 
due to the IT revolution. 
  The importance of close coordination among engineers made possible by 3D CAD 
systems seems to differ across products. Elaborating on Ulrich (1995), Fujimoto (2000; 2001) 
distinguishes two types of products based on the nature of their product-development 
processes; ‘integral architecture’ type and ‘modular architecture’ type. For the former type 
product, the optimal design of one component is closely dependent on the design of other 
components, and so close coordination among engineers of different components are crucial 
for achieving product integrity. Automobile is an example of such product. On the other 
hand, for the latter type product, the optimal design of one component is relatively 
independent of the design of others, and so close coordination among engineers is less 
important. Personal computer is an example of such product.  
Recall that, in our framework, parameter θ  captures the efficiency of the IT-
customized investment such as the investment in 3D CAD systems. Hence, θ  seems to be 
                                                 
11 We have worked out examples (see Appendix B) in which the number of potential suppliers decreases after 







relatively large for ‘integral architecture’ type product and small for ‘modular architecture’ 
type product. Proposition 2 then indicates that pattern III or IV is more likely for ‘integral 
architecture’ type product such as automobile, whereas pattern I or II is more likely for 
‘modular architecture’ type product such as personal computer. In other words, ‘vertical 
keiretsu’ would become weaker or even disappear due to the IT revolution for ‘modular 
architecture’ type product, whereas the IT revolution could even strengthen ‘vertical keiretsu’ 
for ‘integral architecture’ type product.  
 
 
4. Interview results 
  In this section we present findings from our interviews with ten Japanese 
manufacturing firms concerning impacts of the IT revolution on their relationships with 
suppliers. Among the ten firms, one is in the automobile industry, one is in the construction 
machinery industry, one is in the heavy industry, one is in the apparel industry, and six are in 
the electric machinery/electronics industry. Regarding the size of the firms, three firms have 
employees between 2,000 and 10,000, three firms between 10,001 and 30,000, and four firms 
above 30,000. Also, three firms have annual sales between 1,500 and 5,000 (million US$), 
four firms between 5,001 and 25,000, and three firms above 25,000.    
  For each firm, we interviewed a general manager or a manager of their procurement 
division or procurement strategy division, and/or a general manager or a manager who is 
responsible for its computer system for procurement (see Appendix C for details). Note, in 
what follows, the term ‘parts’ is meant to include intermediate products, and we used the 
following definitions in our interviews:  
Customized parts: Parts whose designs and functions are tailored to the specific needs  
of a manufacturer, and whose values would be substantially lower if they were 
used by another manufacturer. 
Standard parts: Parts whose designs and functions are standardized, and whose values  








We first asked the following question in order to identify the ratio of customized and standard 
parts they procure. 
Question 1: Among all parts your firm purchases from suppliers, what percentage (in  
terms of monetary value) would you estimate to be standard parts? 
Then, concerning standard parts, we asked the following questions: 
Question 2-1: Concerning standard parts, is your firm utilizing (and/or planning to  
utilize) the internet in order to enhance the effectiveness of procurement? 
Question 2-2: If the answer to Question 2-1 is yes, does that result in an increase in  
the number of potential suppliers of standard parts? 
   Next, we asked how the recent advances in information technology would affect their 
procurement of customized parts. All interviewees pointed out that it could substantially 
improve the efficiency for designing customized parts. In particular, all firms except the one 
in the apparel industry mentioned that 3D CAD systems substantially improve the efficiency 
for their engineers and suppliers’ engineers to coordinate their design activities. We then 
asked the following questions: 
 Question  3-1: In order to enhance the efficiency for designing customized parts by  
taking advantage of the recent advances in information technology (call it the 
IT revolution hereafter), do your suppliers need to make a substantial level of 
investments customized to your firm? 
Question 3-2: If the answer to Question 3-1 is yes, does that result in a reduction in  
the number of potential suppliers of customized parts? 
  Finally, we attempted to find out whether or not the IT revolution would induce them 
to change the nature of their parts by asking the following two questions: 
Question 4: In order to take advantage of the IT revolution, has your firm changed  
(and/or is your firm going to change) the nature of some parts from 
customized parts into standard parts? 








The interview results are presented in Table 1 on the next page. The results indicate 
that, in contrast to the recent popular argument described in Introduction, ‘vertical keiretsu’ 
type relationships could continue or become stronger due to the IT revolution. According to 
the interviewees’ responses to Question 1, the majority of parts that they purchase from 
suppliers are customized parts. In response to Question 4, seven out of the ten firms told us 
that the IT revolution would not induce them to switch any customized parts to standard 
parts. The other three firms also said that, although they would switch a certain fraction of 
their customized parts to standard parts, other customized parts would remain unaffected. In 
our theoretical framework, this pattern is captured by pattern IV (see Proposition 3), in which 
the manufacturer continues to choose a customized interface after the IT revolution.
12 
Furthermore, five firms out of the ten firms answered ‘yes’ to both Question 3-1 and 
3-2. This pattern is consistent with our prediction that, as a result of the IT revolution, 
manufacturers could purchase customized parts from a smaller number of potential suppliers 
who make higher levels of customized investments than before the revolution. Concerning 
3D CAD systems, there are several widely available 3D CAD systems such as CATIA, I-
DEAS, Pro/ENGINEER and Unigraphics. If a manufacturer uses CATIA, its suppliers also 
need to introduce CATIA in order to enhance the efficiency of designing customized parts. 
This is a substantial customized investment especially for small suppliers (see footnote 10), 
and so it could be infeasible for them to invest in multiple 3D CAD systems for different 
manufacturers. As a result, manufacturers purchase customized parts from a smaller number 
of suppliers. That is, ‘vertical keiretsu’ type relationships could become stronger due to the IT 
revolution. 
  On the other hand, our interview results also indicate that, consistent with the recent 
popular argument, ‘vertical keiretsu’ type relationships could become weaker or even 
disappear for certain parts. According to the interviewees’ responses to Question 1, seven 
firms purchase a non-negligible amount of standard parts. Five out of the seven firms told us 
                                                 
12 Our model also predicts that the IT revolution can induce manufacturers to switch their standard parts to 







Table 1  Interview Results from Ten Japanese Manufacturing Firms (September, 2000) 
 
Question  Firm A  Firm B  Firm C  Firm D  Firm E 












(2-1) Usage of the internet for procuring 
standard parts. 
 
(2-2) The internet procurement increases 



























(3-1) The level of IT-customized 
investments by your suppliers is high. 
 
(3-2) The high IT-customized 



























(4) Switch from customized parts to 












(5) Switch from standard parts to 













Question  Firm F  Firm G  Firm H  Firm I  Firm J 










(2-1) Usage of the internet for procuring 
standard parts. 
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(3-1) The level of IT-customized 
investments by your suppliers is high. 
 
(3-2) The high IT-customized 
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Note:  Firm A (automobile industry), Firm B (construction machinery industry), Firm C (heavy 









in response to Question 2-1 and 2-2 that, for standard parts, they are utilizing (and/or 
planning to utilize) the internet in order to enhance the effectiveness of procurement, which 
results in an increase in the number of potential suppliers of standard parts. Furthermore, 
three firms (firm F, G and H) told us in response to Question 4 that they would switch a 
fraction of their customized parts to standard parts in order to take advantage of the internet 
procurement. For example, an interviewee of Firm F estimated that they would switch 20% of 
their customized parts to standard parts. In our theoretical analysis, these results are captured 
by patterns I and II.  
In summary, consistent with our theoretical predictions, we have identified two 
impacts of the IT revolution through our interviews. On one hand, manufacturers utilize the 
internet in order to procure the standard parts from a larger number of potential suppliers at 
lower prices. In some cases, they switch some of their customized parts to the standard parts 
in order to take advantage of this. This is consistent with the recent popular argument 
concerning the impacts of the IT revolution on Japanese manufacturer-supplier relationships 
as discussed in Introduction. On the other hand, they also utilize the recent advances in 
information technology (3D CAD systems in particular) for enhancing the efficiency of 
designing customized parts. This often requires their suppliers to make a higher level of 
customized investments, and, as a consequence, manufacturers purchase customized parts 
from a smaller number of potential suppliers. In other words, ‘vertical keiretsu’ type 
relationship can become stronger due to the IT revolution.  
A similar pattern has also been identified in the US automobile industry through our 
preliminary interviews which we conducted as a member of a Japanese governmental mission 
to the United States in October 2000. On one hand, US automobile manufacturers utilize the 
internet in order to enhance the efficiency of procurement. In particular, they have recently 
established Covisint, a joint venture of Commerce One, DaimlerChrysler, Ford, General 
Motors, Nissan, Oracle and Renault, which is an e-marketplace designed to let automakers 
find the best price possible for parts from participating suppliers (Kemp, 2001). On the other 
hand, they also utilize the recent advances in information technology, 3D CAD systems in 







manufacturers have adopted different CAD systems (CATIA for DaimlerChrysler, I-DEAS 
for Ford, and Unigraphics for General Motors), and so a supplier needs to acquire the same 
CAD system as the one adopted by its customer in order to design customized parts (see, e.g., 
Braunstein, 1999; Chalmers, 1999; Bundusky, 2000). In our preliminary interviews, a couple 
of automobile manufacturers told us that, as a result of their increasing reliance on CAD 
systems, they would purchase customized parts from a smaller number of suppliers because, 
for many suppliers, it would be financially infeasible to acquire and maintain multiple CAD 
systems.   
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Japanese manufacturers’ cooperative relationships with their suppliers, based on long-
term relationships and suppliers’ willingness to make customized investments, have often 
been called ‘vertical keiretsu’ and are widely recognized as an important source of strength in 
Japanese industries. In the 1980s, it had often been argued that US manufacturers should 
establish Japanese-type cooperative relationships with their suppliers in order to regain their 
productive edge. In contrast, a number of people recently asserted that the recent advances in 
information technology would dramatically change the basic nature of the Japanese 
manufacturer-supplier relationships. Namely, Japanese manufacturers would change the 
nature of parts required for their products from customized parts to standard parts, and 
procure them from a larger number of potential suppliers through the internet rather than 
from a limited number of suppliers within their own corporate groups (or ‘keiretsu’). How 
will the IT revolution impact on manufacturer-supplier relationships? Will ‘vertical keiretsu’ 
disappear in Japan? This is an important question when we consider the sources of strength of 
manufacturing industries in the New Economy. 
This paper addressed this question both theoretically and empirically. We first 
considered a simple theoretical framework that incorporated the two major effects of the IT 
revolution. First, the prevalence of the internet reduces the downstream firm’s cost for 







customized parts can be substantially improved by taking advantage of the IT revolution, 3D 
CAD (Three-dimensional Computer-Aided Design) systems in particular, which enhance the 
efficiency for engineers of manufacturers and suppliers to coordinate their design activities. 
The realization of such efficiency, however, requires higher levels of customized 
investments. For instance, suppliers need to introduce and maintain a 3D CAD system that is 
tailored to that of their purchaser. 
Our model predicted two distinct patterns for impacts of the IT revolution on 
manufacturer-supplier relationships. On one hand, consistent with the recent popular 
argument, the IT revolution can induce the manufacturer to choose the standard interface, and 
contact and communicate with a larger number of potential suppliers for purchasing the 
standard parts. On the other hand, it also predicts that, after the IT revolution, the 
manufacturer can either continue to choose a customized interface or switch from the 
standard interface to a customized interface, and procure customized parts from a smaller 
number of potential suppliers who make higher levels of customized investments. In other 
words, ‘vertical keiretsu’ could become stronger due to the IT revolution.  
We then conducted interviews with ten Japanese manufacturing firms concerning 
impacts of the IT revolution on their relationships with suppliers, and identified both of the 
two predicted patterns described above. Concerning the second impact, five out of ten 
manufacturers expected that, as a result of the IT revolution, they would purchase customized 
parts from a smaller number of potential suppliers. In other words, in contrast to the recent 
popular argument, these manufacturers expected that ‘vertical keiretsu’ type relationship with 
their suppliers would become stronger for some kinds of parts due to the IT revolution. 
We admit that the strength of our evidence is limited because it is based on interviews 
with ten Japanese manufacturing firms rather than rigorous statistical analyses based on a 
random sample of a reasonable size. We however believe that the paper indicates a new 
direction for future empirical investigations concerning the impacts of the IT revolution on 
manufacturer-supplier relationships. In a future research, we plan to conduct such an 








Proof of Proposition 1: Consider a stage 3 subgame in period t (= 1 or 2), where the 
downstream firm chose a customized interface and announced (q, s) in stage 1, and n (≥  1) 
potential suppliers made the required level of customized investments in stage 2. The 
downstream firm has no incentive to announce q such that q < h(0), and so we restrict our 
attention to q such that q ≥  h(0). We analyze an optimal procurement auction designed by the 
downstream firm, by applying standard results of auction theory (see, e.g., Myerson, 1981; 
and Klemperer, 1999 for a survey). 
  The procurement auction can be translated into the following standard setting in 
auction theory: There is one seller who has a single object to sell. The seller faces n bidders 
indexed by i = 1, …, n. Each bidder i’s value estimate for the object, denoted ti, is known 
only to bidder i, and is independently and identically distributed according to a uniform 
distribution between q – c and q – c + 1, where q – c > 0. The seller’s personal value estimate 
for the object is common knowledge and given by t0 = 0. 
  We apply Myerson (1981) (see in particular page 66-7), and obtain the following 
result: The seller’s reserve price in an optimal auction is Max [q – c, (q – c + 1)/2], which is 
equal to q – c.
13 Then, in an optimal auction, 
(i)  if n ≥  2, the bidder with the highest valuation purchases the object. The expected  
amount of money the bidder pays to the seller is the second highest valuation among  
the n bidders.  
(ii) if n = 1, the sole bidder purchases the object by paying q – c. 
This result indicates that, in our optimal procurement auction, 
(i)  if n ≥  2, a potential supplier with the lowest realization of the production cost sells a  
customized part to the downstream firm. The expected payment the supplier receives  
from the downstream firm is equal to the second lowest realization of the production  
cost among the n potential suppliers.  
(ii) if n = 1, the sole potential supplier sells a customized part to the downstream firm and  
receives c as a payment. 
This in turn means that, before the realization of ε it is observed by each upstream firm i, 
each potential supplier’s expected profit from an optimal procurement auction is  
                                                 
































noting that the expected value of jth order statistic from a uniform distribution between 0 and 
1 is j/(n+1). 
  We now establish the following claim. 
 
Claim 1: Suppose that the downstream firm chooses a customized interface in period t. The 
maximum expected profit it can make in that period is Max [π C* + φ , 0], where φ  = λ  if t = 2 
and φ  = 0 if t = 1, and π C* is the maximum value of the following maximization problem: 
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(Note that x + f – s = 1/[n(n + 1)]  π C(x, n; y) = h(x) – n(s + y) – [c – (n – 1)/(n + 1)].) 
Proof:  We first show that the solution exists to the maximization problem. Define χ (z) by 
h'(χ (z)) = z, where z ≥  1. For any given n, let x*(n) and s*(n) denote optimal values for x and 
s, respectively. Note that h(x) is increasing in x, and the objective function is independent of 
s. This implies that x*(n) = χ (n) and s*(n) = χ (n) + f – 1/[n(n+1)] if χ (n) + f – [1/n(n+1)] ≥  0, 
and x*(n) = 1/[n(n+1)] – f and s*(n) = 0 otherwise. The optimal value of n is then the solution 
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Define ψ (z) ≡  h(χ (z)) – z[χ (z) + f + y] – [c – z/(z + 1)], where z ≥  1. By definition of χ (z), we 
have ψ '(z) = – [χ (z) + f + y] + 1/(z + 1)
2. Hence, there exists a value z’ (≥  1) such that ψ (z) is 
monotone decreasing in z for all z ≥  z’. Note also that there exists a natural number n’ such 
that 1/[n(n + 1)] – f < 0 for all n ≥  n’. These imply that the modified problem has a solution, 
denoted n* (≥  1). Then, π C* = π C(x*(n*), n*; y). 
  Now suppose that the downstream firm chooses a customized interface in period t, 
and announces (q, s) in order to maximize its expected profit in period t.  Also, suppose that, 
for t = 2, sufficiently large number of upstream firms made customized investments in the 
previous period. Let m (≥  0) denote the number of potential suppliers that make the required 







procurement auction in stage 3 implies that h
-1(q – φ ) + f  – s ≤  1/[m(m+1)] must hold for m 
(≥  1) upstream firms to make the required level of customized investments, and the 
downstream firm’s profit maximization implies that h
-1(q – φ ) + f  – s = 1/[m(m+1)] holds. 
Then, the downstream firm’s expected profit in period t is 
  q – m(s + y) – [c – (m – 1)/(m + 1)] = q – m{s + y + 1/[m(m + 1)]} – [c – m/(m + 1)] 
                    = h(x) + φ  – m(x + f + y) – [c – m/(m + 1)], 
where x ≡  h
-1(q – φ ). This implies that, if m ≥  1, π C* + φ  ≥  0 must hold and the maximum 
expected profit the downstream firm can make in period t is π C* + φ . On the other hand, if 
π C* + φ  < 0, m = 0 and the maximum expected profit is zero.       Q.E.D. 
  
Now suppose that, in period t, the downstream firm chooses the standard interface and 
contacts and communicates with n (≥  1) potential suppliers. In stage 3, through an optimal 
procurement auction,  
(i)  if n ≥  2, a potential supplier with the lowest realization of the production cost sells the  
standard part to the downstream firm. The expected payment the supplier receives  
from the downstream firm is equal to the second lowest realization of the production  
cost among the n potential suppliers.  
(ii) if n = 1, the sole potential supplier sells the standard part to the downstream firm and  
receives c as a payment. 
Hence, the downstream firm’s expected profit in period t is given by  
  π S(n; y) ≡  g – ny – [c – (n – 1)/(n + 1)]. 
Since π S(n; y) is strictly concave in n, there exists a natural number n** (≥  1) such that  
π S(n; y) takes the maximum value when n = n**. Let π S(n**; y) = π S*. Note that the value of 
y is sufficiently small (by assumption) so that π S* > 0 holds. 
  We now establish the following claim. 
 
Claim 2: The model exhibits the C-equilibrium if Π C* > Π S* and the S-equilibrium if Π C* < 
Π S*, where Π C* ≡  2π C* + λ   and Π S* ≡  2π S*. 
Proof: Suppose that the downstream firm chooses a customized interface and contacts and 
communicates with n* suppliers in stage 1 in both periods, and announces q = h(x*(n*)) and 
s = s*(n*) in stage 1 in period 1 and q = h(x*(n*)) + λ  and s = s*(n*) in stage 1 in period 2, 







holds, and that under the announcement, the required level of customized investment is 
x*(n*) + f – s*(n*) in period 1. Also, in period 2, the required level of customized investment 
is x*(n*) + f – s*(n*) for upstream firms that made customized investments in the previous 
period, and a value strictly greater than x*(n*) + f – s*(n*) for other upstream firms. Then, n* 
upstream firms make the required level of customized investments in each period, and the 
identity of upstream firms that make customized investments is unchanged over periods. The 
downstream firm’s expected profit is π C* in period 1 and π C* + λ  in period 2. Note that π C* 
and π C* + λ   are the maximum expected profits the downstream firm can make by choosing a 
customized interface in each period. On the other hand, if it chooses the standard interface in 
each period, it contacts and communicates with n** potential suppliers and makes the 
expected profit of π S* in each period. Finally, the downstream firm cannot be better off by 
choosing the standard interface in one period and a customized interface in the other.      
Q.E.D. 
 
  Note that h(0) ≥  g and h'(0) = +∞  together imply π C* > π S* if f = 0, and that π C* is 
decreasing in f whereas π S* is independent of f. Also, there exists f’ (> 0) such that π C* < 0 
for all f > f’. Hence, for any given parameter values, there exists a value  f  (> 0) such that, 
holding all parameter values except f fixed, Π C* > Π S* if f < f  and Π C* < Π S* if f > f . 
  Next, we prove n** ≥  n* (which means nS ≥  nC). Suppose, to the contrary, n** < n*. 
We have π S(n*; y) < π S(n**; y), which implies  
– n*y + (n* – 1)/(n* + 1) < – n**y + (n** – 1)/(n** + 1). 
Then, we have 
  π C(x*(n*), n*; y) = h(x*(n*)) – n*(s*(n*) + y) – [c – (n* – 1)/(n* + 1)] 
          < h(x*(n*)) – n**(s*(n*) + y) – [c – (n** – 1)/(n** + 1)] ≡  π C”. 
Note that n** < n* implies x*(n*) + f – s*(n*) ≤  1/[n**(n**+1)]. This means that the 
downstream firm can make π C” (> π C(x*(n*), n*; y) = π C*) as its expected profit in period 1 
by choosing a customized interface, contacting and communicating with n** suppliers, and 











Proof of Proposition 2: We first establish the following claim. 
 
Claim 3: In the variant of the model, suppose that the downstream firm chooses a customized 
interface in period t. The maximum expected profit it can make in that period is  
Max[π C’* + φ , 
* ˆC π + φ , 0], where φ  = λ  if t = 2 and φ  = 0 if t = 1, π C’* is same as π C* defined 
in Claim 1 except that y in the maximization problem is replaced by y’ ≡  y – ∆ y , and 
* ˆC π  is 
the maximum value of the following maximization problem: 
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Proof: Through the procedure analogous to the proof of Claim 1, we can show that the 
solution exists in the maximization problem. 
  Now suppose that the downstream firm chooses a customized interface and announces 
(q, s) in order to maximize its expected profit in period 2. Also, suppose that sufficiently 
large number of upstream firms made customized investments in the previous period. Let m 
(≥  0) denote the number of potential suppliers that make the required level of customized 
investments in period 2. The downstream firm has no incentive to announce q such that q < 
h(0) + λ , and so we restrict our attention to q such that q – λ  ≥  h(0). Assume m ≥  1. Note that, 
if a potential supplier who made a customized investment in the previous period makes the 
required level of customized investment, it chooses an IT-customized investment if and only 
if h
-1(q – λ ) ≥  h
-1((q – λ )/θ ) + ∆ f holds. Then, through the same logic as in the proof of 
Proposition 1, we find that Min [ h
-1(q – λ ), h
-1((q – λ )/θ ) + ∆ f] + f – s = 1/[m(m+1)] must 
hold, where the left hand side of the equation is the required level of customized investment. 
Then, the downstream firm’s expected profit in period 2 is  
q – m(s + y’) – [c – (m – 1)/(m + 1)]  
= q – m{Min [ h
-1(q – λ ), h
-1((q – λ )/θ ) + ∆ f] + f + y’} – [c – m/(m + 1)].  
Suppose h
-1(q – λ ) ≥  h
-1((q – λ )/θ ) + ∆ f, and let x ≡  h
-1((q – λ )/θ ). Then, the downstream 
firm’s expected profit in period 2 is  ) ' ; , ( ˆ y m x C π + λ , where x + f + ∆ f  – s = 1/[m(m+1)]. The 
maximum possible expected profit in period t is then 
* ˆC π + λ . Suppose h
-1(q – λ ) <  
h
-1((q – λ )/θ ) + ∆ f, and let x ≡  h
-1(q – λ ). Then, the downstream firm’s expected profit in 







profit in period 2 is then π C’* + λ . Finally, if m = 0, the downstream firm’s profit in period 2 
is zero. This completes the proof for t = 2 case. The proof for t = 1 case is analogous.  Q.E.D. 
 
 Define  λ π + ≡ Π
* * ˆ 2 ˆ
C C , Π C’* ≡  2π C’* + λ  and Π S’* ≡  2π S’*, where π S’* is same as π S* 
defined in the proof of Proposition 1 except that y in the maximization problem is replaced by 
y’. Through a similar procedure as in the proof of Claim 2, we find the following: The variant 
of the model exhibits the S-equilibrium if Π S’* > Max[Π C’*,
* ˆ
C Π ] and the C-equilibrium if 
Π S’* < Max[Π C’*,
* ˆ
C Π ]. Note that h(0) ≥  g and h'(0) = +∞  together imply Max[π C’*,
* ˆC π ] > 
π S’* if f = 0, and that Max[π C’*,
* ˆC π ] is decreasing in f whereas π S’* is independent of f. Also, 
there exists f” (> 0) such that Max[π C’*,
* ˆC π ] < 0 for all f > f”. Hence, for any given parameter 
values, there exists a value  f  (> 0) such that, holding all parameter values except f fixed, 
Max[Π C’*,
* ˆ
C Π ] > Π S’* if f < f  and Max[Π C’*,
* ˆ
C Π ] < Π S’* if f > f . Through a similar 
procedure as in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be shown that nS ≥  nC holds. This completes 
the proof of (i).  
  To prove (ii), first note that ∆ f > 0  
* ˆC π  < π C’* if θ  = 1, and that 
* ˆC π  is increasing in 
θ  while π C’* is independent of θ . Hence, there exists θ ’ (> 1) such that Max[Π C’*,
* ˆ
C Π ] = 
* ˆ
C Π  
if and only if θ  > θ ’, which implies (a). Note also that 
* ˆ
C Π  is increasing in θ , and 
* ˆ
C Π  →  ∞  as 
θ  →  ∞ , while Π C’* and Π S’* are independent of θ . Hence, Max[Π C’*,
* ˆ
C Π ] is increasing in 
(independent of) θ  for all θ  > θ ’ (θ  < θ ’), which implies (b). Furthermore, 
* ˆ
C Π  is decreasing 
in ∆ f while Π C’* is independent of ∆ f. Hence, Max[Π C’*,
* ˆ
C Π ] is decreasing in (independent 
of) θ  if θ  > θ ’ (if θ  < θ ’), which implies (c).   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: Propositions 1 and 2 together imply the following: pattern I emerges 
if f > Max[ f f , ], pattern III emerges if  f f f < <  , and pattern IV emerges if f < 
Min[ f f , ]. Note that 
* ˆ
C Π  →  ∞  as θ  →  ∞  (see the previous proof) implies  f →  ∞  as θ  →  ∞ , 
while  f  is independent of θ . Hence,  f f <  holds if θ  is sufficiently large. We show the 
possibility of pattern II by an example. Let h(x) = 0.4x
1/2 + 3.0, g = 2.1, c = 1.5, f = 0.1, ∆ f = 







and Max[π C’*, 
* ˆC π ] ≈  1.45 < π S’* ≈  1.51. Then, Π S
* < Π C
* and Max[Π C’*,
* ˆ
C Π ] < Π S’* hold 
when λ  is sufficiently small, and so pattern II emerges in this example.  Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix B 
In this appendix we present an example which exhibits pattern IV and the number of potential 
suppliers decreases after the IT revolution. We use the same notation as in Appendix A. Let 
h(x) = 0.4x
1/2 + 3.2, g = 2.1, c = 1.5, f = 0.08, ∆ f = 0.02, y = 0.005, ∆ y = 0.003, θ  = 1.3. We 
find, π S* ≈  1.41 < π C* ≈  1.65, π S’* ≈  1.48 < π C’* ≈  1.66 <  70 . 1 ˆ
* ≈ C π , and so Π S
* < Π C
* and 
Π S’* < Π C’* < 
* ˆ
C Π  hold. We also find that nC = 5 in the C-equilibrium of the original model, 




We have interviewed the following individuals in each firm (we cannot reveal the names of 
firms and individuals). The interviews have been conducted in Tokyo between 21 September 
and 29 September, 2000. Interviews took 1.5 – 3 hours, and many of them were followed by 
additional questions by e-mails and/or telephones. 
 
Firm Industry  Interviewed  individuals 
A  Automobile  Manager, Procurement Planning; 
Assistant Manager, Public Relations 
B  Construction machinery  Executive Managing Director; 
General Manager, Computer System; 
Manager, Computer System 
C  Heavy industry  Manager, Procurement; 
Manager, Corporate Strategy 
D  Apparel  General Manager, Procurement; 
Manager, Computer System 
E  Electric machinery/ Electronics  General Manager, Procurement System; 
Manager, Information System 
F  Electric machinery/ Electronics  General Manager, Procurement Strategy 
G  Electric machinery/ Electronics  Senior General Manager, Procurement 
Management 
H  Electric machinery/ Electronics  General Manager, Information System; 
General Manager, Production Planning 
I  Electric machinery/ Electronics  General Manager, Procurement; 
Manager, Procurement 
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